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Strategy of Fast Retailing
－Exploring the Organizational Growth and Success－
Takeo Iida
This paper centers on the strategic management of Fast Retailing which not only disrupted but innovated
the Japanese apparel industry in the 1990s. The Uniqlo brand is very familiar to Japanese consumers. The
company was modestly established in a prefecture west of Japan twenty years ago, but has grown to be the
most dominant category killer in the Japanese apparel industry. Fast Retailing sold almost 8 million fleece
jackets in 1998 only. Presently, however, the company suffers an innovator’s dilemma because it has failed
to achieve the sales target after the success of its blockbuster, fleece. Sales are stable now, but growth is
slowing. It appears that SPA is no longer a panacea to maintain success. Nonetheless, the dynamic
organizational pattern is always global-oriented. Fast Retailing has begun to embark on an aggressive
worldwide M&A to increase its total amount of sales. The ultimate game plan is to catch up with GAP and
possibly to outgrow the gigantic apparel company.
Key Words: Tadashi Yanai, Fast Retailing, Uniqlo, SPA, Dominant Strategy, SCM, Scrap and Build-Based
Store Opening, China, Fleece, Internalization Theory
Ⅰ.  Introduction
This paper deals with the organizational
development of Fast Retailing Inc. Fast Retailing
achieved tremendous success in the late 1990s while
the Japanese economy was debilitated in the wake of
the bubble economy. In particular, The success of Fast
Retailing stood in stark contrast to the recessionary
situation in which most leading Japanese companies
suffered continuous financial losses and many
historically entrenched and renowned companies went
bankrupt.
Fast Retailing is well known to Japanese
consumers under the familiar brand name, Uniqlo, an
abbreviation of Unique Clothing Warehouse. Fast
Retailing was listed on the First Section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange in 1999. Presently, it is a major
apparel company with nearly 550 stores across Japan.
This paper comprises the following five sections:
history of the company, structural analysis of its
success; the present management problems of Fast
Retailing; theoretical implications relating to
multinational corporations; and the conclusion.
Specifically, the first section of the paper deals with
chronological descriptions of how Fast Retailing was
successfully developed during a short period from the
1970s to 1990s.
The second section focuses on a structural analysis
of Fast Retailing with reference to its rapid
organizational development. In particular, the success
of Fast Retailing is investigated with regard to the
various planes of management and its industrial
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surroundings. Seven factors of success are examined.
The third section centers on five present
management barriers that stymie further growth of the
company. These barriers are scrutinized with special
relation to sales deployment domestically as well as
overseas. They curb further growth of Fast Retailing
in Japan. At the same time, they also prevent the
company from successfully advancing in the foreign
countries such as China, England, and the United
States.
The fourth section focuses on the theoretical
implications of the behavioral patterns of multinational
corporations with respect to internalization theory.
Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the not-so-
distant future of development for Fast Retailing.
Ⅱ.  History
1.  In Search of His Own Identity
It is important to look at the early career period
before Tadashi Yanai, the company founder,
established Fast Retailing. Yanai was born in
Okayama, 200 kilometers west of Osaka in 1948.
Okayama-city is the capitol of Okayama Prefecture.
However, it is a rural and mediocre city, compared
with Tokyo, Osaka or Fukuoka, which are vibrant with
businesses covering a huge population.
His father was a haberdasher and a local celebrity
in Okayama City. Yanai was both reticent and
recalcitrant. When Yanai was in his teens, his dream
was to run a toy shop someday. His father was so
paternalistic that the son fought shy of him. It can be
readily imagined that there was a psychological
standoff between father and son because he was
oppressed by his father’ s high expectations of his son’ s
future career. However, this tense relationship made
the son tenacious and opinionated.
Yanai graduated from the Department of
Commerce at Waseda University, which was ranked
as one of the top private prestigious universities in
Japan. Through his father’s influence, he was recruited
after graduation by JUSCO in 1972, which later
became ION, one of the major Japanese General
Merchandize Stores (GMS). However, he was still
psychologically lethargic in working despite his uphill
efforts.
Yanai quit JUSCO in 1973 because he found it
difficult to regard himself as a cog in the wheel of a
company. He was anxious to establish his identity. At
the same time he was looking for a new career path.
He traveled in the U.S to acquire overseas experience.
During these turbulent years, Yanai met a girl he
wanted to marry. His father took advantage of this
opportunity to persuade his son to come back to
Okayama to work with him in return for support of
the marriage. He acquiesced to his father’s request.
This was a first substantial stepping stone to building
his own company.
2.  Nurturing Entrepreneurship
Yanai joined his father’s company in 1973 when
annual sales were about 100 million yen. However, a
couple of years after he joined the company, several
employees quit because he confronted them about
management policy.
These early learning experiences in management
seemed insurmountable to him, but he never
compromised. He was regarded as so unyielding and
undeffered among employees that they shied away
from him. This was his first excruciating experience
to overcome daily mundane business chores. He was
all the more confident in managing the company.
He came up with a good idea to set up a new
business, based on frequent visits to co-ops at
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universities in the U.S. His idea stemmed from a
concept of a casual atmosphere-based apparel shop
that enabled customers to feel free to come and go
without being served. However, this ambitious
business blueprint apparently ran counter to the
concept of apparel shops oriented to Designers &
Characters Brand (DC), which flourished in the 1980s.
In the 1980s, the small and medium-sized apparel
companies produced their own DC-based clothes that
appealed to younger people in their late teens and early
20s. These companies won enormous influence over
younger generations who were very sensitive to their
own identities no matter how expensive DC-based
clothes were. In particular, slinky fashions were
highlighted among even ordinary citizens during the
1986 － 1990 period which typified the age of the
bubble economy when some women went to
discotheques, decked out in slinky clothing.
DC-based clothes and slinky women’s suits
represented a luxurious way of living. However, they
went out of fashion as the bubble economy burst in
the early 1990s. In the wake of severe economic
conditions, people were becoming interested in more
casual fashion that appeared affordable, thrifty and
less expensive. This change in the fashion trend was
favorable for Fast Retailing, but it took for Yanai
another five years to make his low price strategy work
successfully.
3.  The Birth of Uniqlo
In 1984, Uniqlo, the original retail outlet of Fast
Retailing, opened its first store in Hiroshima City in
southwestern Japan. According to Yanai, this first store
was located off a main street in a city shopping mall
of the city. It was a modest start.
The major customers of Uniqlo consisted of junior
and senior level high school students. Popularity was
enormous because the prices of goods were set
exceptionally low, compared to those in others apparel
shops. Most clothes were imported from developing
countries. However, this low-price strategy denoted
shabby quality.
Moreover, Yanai began to find shortcomings in
the sales of the ready-to-wear suits because of
speculative shipments and an unstable pipeline that
were based on labor intensive production without
proper logistical systems and quality controls. He
wanted to re-formulate sales tactics.
4.  Early Strategy
Fast Retailing adopted an all-out and invariably
low price strategy regardless of the traditional strategic
patterns of the Japanese apparel industry. These
outstanding and deeply ingrained features are as
follows: fashion-conscious designs, timely seasonable
inventory and the accompanying unique Japanese
market particularity. This was a dauntless challenge
to existing apparel makers. As Yanai once put it,
“Clothing is a part of wardrobe. It should not be judged
in total coordination”.(1)  For him, clothing was nothing
but function to fulfill the everyday lives of people.
In 1985, Fast Retailing opened shops in
Shimonoseki, 50 kilometers west of Ogori, and in
Okayama, 100 kilometers east of Ogori. These two
shops were built along national roads. In apparel
terminology, they were known as “Road Side Shops”.
Management came to understand that sales turnover
of suburbs shops are much better than that of down-
town-based shops. It turned out that suburban shops
could attract all generations, not specifically limited
ones.
For that reason, Fast Retailing formulated its
marketing strategy in the following way: clothing must
be featured or oriented as (1) basic tone, which means
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that clothing design is not changed with the seasons,
(2) casual clothing that people usually wear at home
or on holidays, (3) clothing for all ages and (4) unisex.
The advertisement and sales promotion totally
depended on folded fliers circulated with leading
Japanese newspapers. This project was welcomed by
people who were starving for affordable clothes.
However, Fast Retailing faced the problem that
clothes that sold well tended to be out of stock, while
clothes that were hardly sold had to be sold at a loss.
Nonetheless, Fast Retailing challenged the traditional
marketing method because most prices in the apparel
industry remained nearly unchanged despite of a
highly over-valued yen that was triggered by the Plaza
Agreement in 1985.
5.  Challenging Traditional Business Customs
In 1987, Fast Retailing developed an original
production system. The first challenge of Fast
Retailing was to destroy the notoriously hidebound
customs of the Japanese apparel industry. These
included two dominant business conventions. The first
was that, on an unconditional basis, shop owners had
a right to send clothes back to manufacturers when
judged unsellable. This means that the order amount
was not a transaction risk because retailers never
suffered from overstock. The second reason was that
manufacturers established the prices for their products,
not shop owners. Shop owners were also unable to
make decisions to re-order clothes that were in high
demand. (see, Chart 1 Sales and Stores of Fast
Retailing Group)
Chart 1
SALES AND STORES OF FAST RETAILING GROUP
sales, based on Supply Chain Management.
In the 1980s, Yanai frequently visited Hong Kong
to investigate how SPA worked. In particular he met
with Jimmy Lai, who ran Giordano International with
headquarters located in Hong Kong. Yanai took
6.  SPA System
SPA is an abbreviated management term of
“speciality store retailer of private label apparel.” SPA
may be defined to optimize a whole management
process which covers R&D, logistics, inventory and
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longer depending on wholesalers and manufacturers
like the traditional model.
The relationship between Fast Retailing and trading
companies was construed as a strategic alliance.
However, Fast Retailing did not have the sufficient
capability of dealing with sophisticated specification
sufficient enough to produce clothes with good quality
because the companies did not employ good designers
in their organization. Consequently, the early SPA,
which performed poorly,  was incessantly involved in
price reduction. The budget was estimated in a so
sweeping way that the sales forecast was not
trustworthy.
Moreover, even after contracts were completed,
based on SPA, the apparel manufacturing companies
shipped only 60% to 70% of the total to Fast Retailing
because they did not trust the companies that placed
Chart 2
UNIQLO’s Business Model
Source: 2004 Annual Report. Fast. Retailing
interest in products manufactured in Giordano. This
company was a sub-contractor of The Limited, a major
U.S. apparel company. The company expanded
production lines. Yanai also researched the business
models of The Limited and GAP. He came to realize
that the SPA system should be introduced in his
company, and that he should abandon the traditional
operation in merchandizing from the wholesaler and
relying on manufacturers.
In 1987, Fast Retailing decided to embark on a
new path. The company wanted to set prices on
products sold in their stores. SPA enabled Fast
Retailing to break through the old concept of
marketing and production in the Japanese apparel
industry. This new business model took the form of
an innovative manufacturing retailer that handled all
procurement, logistics and merchandise, that were no
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orders. Following a deeply rooted business convention,
they eventually sent back clothes that did not sell to
the manufacturing companies. (see, Chart 2
UNIQLO’s BUSINESS MODEL)
7.  Overseas Production
Fast retailing does not have its own factories. It
contracts with factories in China, most of which are
located in areas near Shanghai. At first, Fast Retailing
had an alliance with Tomen, a leading trading
company in Japan. This trading company has business
knowledge of the Chinese industrial climate dating
back to the 1930’s, when the subsidiary was
established in China. However, Fast Retailing canceled
the contract with Tomen and with local owners of
apparel-related factories in the provinces in Southern
China.
It should be noted that Fast Retailing sent a lot
employees to the contracted factories to teach the
production processes. These employees were mid-
career recruits who retired from textile companies.
They were called “Dexterity Teams”. They were
skilled enough to improve the quality of goods being
produced in these factories.
Many local factories contracted with not only Fast
Retailing but also with foreign apparel companies. The
owners of factories also welcomed advisers from Fast
Retailing to instruct local workers because heightening
the quality of goods has the potential to create lucrative
opportunities to contract with other foreign companies.
8.  Spread of Uniqlo Shops
Japan was in the throes of a long-standing recession
after the bubble economy burst in the beginning of
the 1990s. While the country faced declining
commodity prices, including real estate, Fast Retailing
cashed in on this opportunity. The company began to
accelerate during the early 1990s with 60 to 70 new
stores opening each year.
At the same time, the company embarked on
franchising. However, this was a small proportion of
the shops directly controlled. In 1988, a joint venture
was established for material procurement. In 1989,
The Osaka office was opened for R&D. Despite
strenuous management efforts, the prices of goods
were reduced at a loss until they were sold out. The
ratio of operating profit hovered around between 1%
to 2% in the late 1980s.
In 1990, the sales turnover of Fast Retailing
achieved 5 billion yen at the time it canceled franchised
systems in order to make management more
effectively organized.
At the same time, the Spirit Campaign was
launched: men’s suits and all relevant goods for the
total coordination were sold in the shops. The next
year, sales soared to 7.1 billion yen.
9.  Towards a Big Leap
On September 1, 1991, a stupendous grand design
was declared by Yanai in front of employees in the
higher echelon of management. He said to them, “We
are determined to open 30 shops every year and are
therefore going to have more than 100 shops all over
Japan in three years’ time, and at the time we are
planning our company’s initial public offering”. (2) He
was confident of envisaging a new era in the apparel
industry. The days of SPA were numbered. This was
a second strategic watershed to the further
development of Fast Retailing for Yanai.
The registered name of the company was changed
from Ogori Shoji to Fast Retailing. Fast Retailing was named
after ‘Fast Service’ like the service in fast food shops.
Yanai postulated that the sales amount would climb
to 30 billion yen if the number of shops exceeded 300.
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However, Yanai was very apprehensive about three
problems: financial difficulties, the shortage of human
resources, and shabby merchandising. In particular,
the local bank that worked with Fast Retailing had a
skeptical attitude towards a daring management policy
and chronically stringent financial conditions.
10.  Conflicts with Banks
Banks can be a driving force for the organizational
development of companies, but they can also curb their
organizational growth. Yanai was preoccupied with
financing for the survival of his business. If he failed
to get financial support from the bank, the company
would have easily faced bankruptcy.
The main bank was reluctant to continue financing
Fast Retailing beyond the ambit of loans. Management
of the bank regarded Yanai’s game plan as too
reckless. The main bank assumed that, if it had
continued to finance, Fast Retailing would have fallen
into insolvency.
The main bank required Yanai to give collateral
for a guarantee in return for a loan, as do most Japanese
banks. Banks customarily tend to send members of
staff from their organization to the companies
concerned in order to control management. Therefore,
the banks were apt to regard companies as their
subsidiaries under surveillance. This was an anathema
to Yanai.
11.  IPO in Turbulence
Fast Retailing prepared for an IPO (Initial Public
Offering) as it rapidly expanded its number of shops.
However, the bank threatened to pull out the money it
lent to Fast Retailing at the time when Fast Retailing
was beginning to embark on the IPO. Nonetheless,
the bank reluctantly cooperated with the IPO that Fast
Retailing planned on schedule because the bank also
might have run the risk of bankruptcy if it had forced
this company to be financially cornered.
According to the CPA (Certified Public Account)
who was in charge of the IPO of Fast Retailing, the
major barriers came from the unclear relationship
between Fast Retailing and the affiliated companies
run by Yanai’s relatives when Fast Retailing was listed
on the stock market. The CPA suggested to Yanai that
he should not only remove the CEOs of these affiliated
companies, but also stop financing these companies.
More importantly, the loans which were imposed upon
Yanai himself must be cancelled, based on the
consultation of banks dealing in Fast Retailing. These
transparent accounting proceedures had to be done
before the meticulous auditing was conducted by the
authorities.(3)
The company went public on the Hiroshima Stock
Exchange in 1994. For Yanai, it was an ambitious
attempt to make the company grow equivalent to GAP
in the U.S. and Marks & Spencer in the U.K. The
biggest merit of the IPO was to throw off the shackles
of the banks dealing with Fast Retailing.
After the IPO, the stock surged to 14,900 yen and,
consequently, Fast Retailing received 13,4 billion yen.
The company had a good reputation through the
market. The success of the IPO gave formidable
confidence to Yanai. His next aim was to realize an
IPO in a bigger arena, the Tokyo Stock Exchange. It
was successfully realized in February, 1994. Fast
Retailing was listed in the Second Section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange on April 1997. and subsequently
listed in February 1999.
12.  Difficulty in Recruiting Versatile People
One of the crucial management tasks of this period
was to recruit people with good business acumen.
Successful applicants came from various business
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backgrounds. Yanai did not want a company
organization teeming with administrators because in
his opinion they tend to make an organizational
structure bureaucratic.
Yanai was anxious to recruit resourceful
employees through classified advertisement in
newspapers.  The content  of  the classif ied
advertisement was as follows: We need a CEO and
Executives.
He expected seasoned applicants with versatile
business experiences. However, most applicants came
to the company to have job interviews with the idea
that their positions would be well-secured and to be
respected when they were hired. As turned out, they
were not highly-motivated to commit themselves to
business. This recruitment brought to Yanai the
opposite result he had never expected.
13.  Prerequisites for Good Locations
(1) In Quest for Good Locations
Yanai strongly believed that good locations of
shops can greatly contribute to sales turnover.
Management of Fast Retailing intended to open shops
along busy streets or national roads because heavily
traveled roads could easily enable customers to
recognize Uniqlo. In 2005, Road Side Shops accounted
for 70 % of the total shops.
However, in the first stage of opening shops,
management was not able to choose locations in
geographically advantageous areas because the costs
were so high. Instead, Fast Retailing rented second-
rate real estate and renovated used houses for Uniqlo.
It should be noted in terms of operating costs that Fast
Retailing never purchased real estate or buildings for
opening shops.
On the one hand, Fast retailing could successfully
open shops on the basis of the schedule in the area of
Western Japan because management was familiar with
business conventions of these regions. However, this
was not the case with Eastern Japan, whose
commercial kernel is Tokyo where cut-throat
competition of Japanese apparel industries were
invariably deployed. When Fast retailing advanced in
the Chiba Prefecture bordering Tokyo in Eastern
Japan, it failed to attract customers because they
scarcely knew the name of Uniqlo.
(2) Tactical Deployment
Fast Retailing usually opened shops in the suburbs
of provincial cities or in satellite cities of major
metropolitan areas. The second Uniqlo shop of
Yamanota exemplified this tactic in that, before this
store was rented and renovated, it used to be an
automobile repair factory located in the outskirts of
Shimonoseki city, Yamaguchi Prefecture.
However, in addition to Road Side Shops, the
company also began to open shops in shopping malls
or shopping complexes as the number of shops
increased. The average amount of investment cost one
hundred million yen. The lease term of shops in the
suburbs generally lasted between ten and twenty years,
whereas the usual contract term of shops in the
shopping malls did not exceed three years. All shops
were lease based. Fast retailing avoided running the
risk of purchasing fixed properties. When it was judged
that the shop could not yield enough profit in return
for investment, management decided to close that shop
as soon as possible. (4)
14.  Transient Stalemate
In 1994, Uniqlos’ sibling brands Famiqlo and
Spoqlo came out along with Uniqlo in order to expand
business. However, these two brands disappeared
within six months because of awkward marketing
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tactics. There were three reasons for this failure: (1)
management could not succeed in making customers
cognizant of the difference among the three brands;
(2) consumers found it inconvenient to go shopping
at these three different kinds of shops individually
because Spoqlo and Famiqlo failed to establish their
own originalities; (3) the goods in Uniqlo shops were
so frequently dispatched to Spoqlo and Famiqlo shops
in order to maintain the large assortment of goods in
stock of these two new brand shops that a shortage of
both goods occurred on the Uniqlo’s side.
In 1998, the number of shops under direct
management totaled 300. However, this number of
shops did not meet expectations of management in
terms of dominant strategy of marketing that
strengthened the competitive edge.(5) What is worse,
the stock which had reached 20,000 yen when the IPO
was made in 1994 gradually fell to 1000 yen in 1998.
It was stated in the media that the rapid growth of
Fast Retailing had reached a stalemate.
15.  ABC Reform
In June, 1998, All Better Change (ABC) Reform
was implemented. The aim of ABC was to transform
from sales-push oriented processes to demand-pull
oriented ones. This reform was an imperative for
salvaging the debilitating organization.
In order to facilitate ABC Reform, a just-in-time
system was established while sales information from
each shop was transmitted to the head office. This just-
in-time system contributed to a timely supply of
clothes to the individual shops, based on the demand
forecast. Through the reform, the design office of New
York and the office of Osaka were closed. Imported
goods through licensing contracts were also abolished.
The super star shop head system was introduced
during a period of ABC Reform. Decision-making was
to a great extent relegated to each shop head. The aim
of this system was to encourage the members of the
head shop to take initiative at their discretion without
waiting for directives from the headquarters or
sounding their views out to the higher echelon.
Accordingly, this system motivated them to make their
own decision-making, partly because the promotion
of their salary was based on meritocracy and partly
because the system was inimical to the aggrandizement
of bureaucracy in the organization. It is interesting to
note that a worker on a part-time basis could be
promoted to regular worker if he/she is judged to be
skillful, and that he/she could also be entitled to
become a super star shop head.
It seemed to follow what Peter Drucker stated more
than 50 years ago.“The manager is the dynamic, life-
living element in every business. Without his
leadership the resources of production remain
resources and never become production”(6)
16.  Towards Establishment of Uniqlo Brand
“Is Uniqlo a Brand?” Most people still ask this
with disparaging attitudes. It may be interesting to
investigate how the Uniqlo brand has been
successfully established.
It is still observed that Uniqlo is not a brand because
its products have been categorized as commodities
since the first shop was opened in 1984. In particular,
Fast Retailing was long recognized as a discount
retailer. People agreed to buy “discounted clothes with
poor quality”. No matter how hard Fast Retailing
developed clothes with higher quality, the deeply
ingrained stereotype could not easily be dispelled
among consumers. It was often said in the early stage
of the company that when customers bought some
clothes in the Uniqlo shops, many of them tended to
throw away the bag on which the logo of Uniqlo was
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inscribed because it was not associated with high social
status. Notwithstanding this predicament, Yanai was
determined to succeed in making Uniqlo a national
brand. Fast Retailing took four measures in order to
enhance brand recognition(7).
First, Fast Retailing contacted Widen & Kennedy,
which was a well-known, U.S.-based advertising
company. This company hired top notch designers
who dealt with Nike. Fast Retailing was also beginning
to take cognizance of the limited effect of fliers upon
the market. The advance of Uniqlo in the heart of
Osaka turned out to be sorely tested in that it did not
attract as many customers as expected. The flier-
focused advertisement method functioned well in the
roadside shops when fliers were distributed in the
suburbs of metropolitan cities, but it did not perform
well in the shops at the center of metropolitan areas
such as Tokyo and Osaka.
Second, Fast Retailing gradually abolished dealing
in clothes that fell under the national brand(8) on
grounds that this dealing system undermined and
deteriorated the brand image of Uniqlo, although  it
contributed to the increase in sales.
Third ,  management  acknowledged that
establishing the brand had to be closely related to
enhancing the quality of products along with
intensified and sophisticated advertisement. The
company took a closer look at factories located in
China, not leaving production management to the
trading company because these trading companies also
left production to sub-contracted factories which took
the form of Original Equipment Manufacturing
(OEM). Moreover, Fast Retailing called the factories
for cancellation when they showed poor operations
and productivity.
Fourth, Fast Retailing introduced the concept of
service management at the shop floor level in order to
not only give customers good impressions, but also to
make them want to call again. The service
management systems were as follows: (1) customers
can return goods they bought within the past three
months; (2) avoid running out of stock; (3) keeping
the shop tidy. Management has to probe what is going
on at the shop level to increase the degree of quality
in the goods made by Fast Retailing.
17.  Advance to Harajuku
In 1996 the company established a network of 205
stores since its beginning in Hiroshima in 1984, and
continued to expand in concentric circles. Before Fast
Retailing advanced to Harajuku, the image of Uuniqlo
was conceived as shoddy.
In 1998, Uniqlo opened a flagship store in
Harajuku, the youth fashion mecca in Tokyo. Harajuku
is the huge, bustling downtown retail fashion core in
Japan that features forthcoming trends in the Japanese
apparel industry. This was a third strategic watershed
for Yanai to make the company not only much bigger,
but also more prestigious.
Before the flagship shop was opened in Harajuku,
however, Fast Retailing had learned severe lessons
from the failure of the Osaka shop. The opening
procedure was cautiously prepared. First, the
architecture of the shop was designed with three
stories, different from existing shops with a single-
story structure. Second, a “media mix strategy” was
deployed in the following ways: posters announcing
the opening of the new shop and fleece sales
campaigns were put up at the concourses of Harajuku
and Shibuya stations, where millions of people get
off or change trains; and advertising posters were hung
inside the trains running in the metropolitan lines. The
number of stores expanded to over 550 nationwide in
1998.
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18.  Fleece as Blockbuster
The tremendous success of Uniqlo was described
as the “Uniqlo Phenomenon” in the media because
almost 8 million fleece jackets were sold in 1998 alone.
E-commerce was also introduced to expand the sales
of fleece. And in particular, unique T. V. commercials
contributed to the turnover of fleece. This was a “fad”
in which people were preoccupied with buying Uniqlo
brand goods. In 2000, the total sales turnover
amounted to 418.5 billion yen. As a result, the
management strategy of Fast Retailing was featured
in the media with admiration.
Fast Retailing assumed that fleece was in far higher
demand than the company had expected a couple of
years before it became a blockbuster. Success came
from the exploitation of the potential demand in light
of the circumspect assumptions made by management.
Yanai admitted in the book(9) that the explosive
sales of fleece led the company to a marvelous success,
but it resulted from the lessons of numerous failures
which ocurred through past trials and errors. He
reasoned that the bottom line for success is how fast
management can identify mistakes inadvertently
underlying ongoing projects, and at the same time,
how tactfully management can modify the original
plan to the right direction right away, which enables
managers to candidly concur with management on
every aspect of decision making.
19.  Serious Setbacks
(1) Advance to U.K. and its Failure
The crunch came in 2001 when Uniqlo stores were
opened in the U.K. It appeared that Yanai’s dreams
almost came true because he had wanted to make the
company operate worldwide like GAP or NIKE. The
tremendous success of fleece readily compelled Fast
Retailing to advance to the U.K. Management
appointed an experienced person who used to work
for Marks & Spencer, a prestigious emporium, as the
CEO of the U.K. subsidiary. Also, Yanai wanted to
expand the number of shops in the U.K. to 50 in three
years. However, the first overseas advance backfired.
There were two reasons for the failure.
First, the company was not familiar with the British
management climate and business conventions. Yanai
explained in his book that the advance in the U.K.
was too hasty, and that this rough-and-ready method
caused a slew of flaws that set the subsidiary into a
quagmire.
The organizational structure of the U.K. subsidiary
was too bureaucratic to operate shops effectively, and
reflected an ingrained tradition of the British class
society. The shops were not well-organized and shop
clerks were not so well-trained to satisfy customers,
frustrating headquarters. In particular, Yanai blamed
the British CEO for not integrating employees into
the organization with esprit de corps, and replaced him
with Tamatsuka, a senior management expatriate from
Japan.
Second, feasibility studies were not well-prepared
before the advance to the U.K. Polo shirts did not sell
well because management never recognized the
difference in weather between Japan and Britain in
terms of humidity. British people hardly needed polo
shirts because the weather of this country was dry,
and quite different from that of Japan.
It was decided that the un-profitable shops would
be closed immediately. Sixteen out of the twenty U.K.
stores were shuttered. The remaining shops are run at
the center of city.
In the case of China, in 2002 Fast Retailing
cautiously opened shops based on the severe lesson
from the U.K. The number of shops was gradually
increased, but the company was slow to open shops.
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These shops are sparsely operated at the heart of
Shanghai, not predicated on the dominant strategy of
marketing theory. It can be said that shop operations
in China are still in the experimental stage.
(2) End of Boom
The success of Fast Retailing, however, did not
last long as soon as the fleece boom faded away. The
company could not find an alternative blockbuster
product for fleece. Sales turnover plummeted in 2001,
and the company’s downturn continued. The
predicament of Fast Retailing revealed that SPA was
not a panacea. No matter how cost-effective overseas
operations were, there was always the possibility that
parent companies would fail to maintain a competitive
advantage, or to lose dominance in the domestic
marketplace.
Is Fast Retailing’s global SCM so efficient that it
overproduced, destroying the very consumer trends it
created? It seemed that Fast Retailing was suffering
from innovator’s dilemma in that the company could
not get out of the vortex of great business success,
which had already lapsed.
Fast Retailing, which dominated the Japanese
apparel market in the late 1990’s, is rapidly losing
both profitability and market share. The company has
been in an 18 consecutive-month downturn. Sales
continued to be sluggish in Japan, plummeting 28.6%
in the 2001－ 02 fiscal year. Fast Retailing was not
able to establish lasting brand loyalty. The Uniqlo
boom has turned bust. The CEO, Mr. Yanai,
consequently stepped down to encourage corporate
renewal in 2003.
(3) Retreat from Diversified Business
In 2002, at the time when Fast Retailing was in a
quagmire, the company established a subsidiary named
FR Foods to embark on the sales of organic vegetables.
The company envisaged that vegetables grown with
agrochemicals are marketed while safe vegetables
would be in high demand in the market in the not-so-
distant future.
The new brand named SKIP was launched.
Vegetables were distributed through on-line order
while FR Foods opened six SKIP shops in the famous
department stores to sell directly to customers. The
prices of vegetables were 20%－30% more expensive,
compared with those sold in supermarkets or ordinary
grocery stores. SKIP was gradually winning brand
loyalty among those who wished to buy organic
vegetables. However, SKIP turnover was poorer than
management had expected. Management began to take
a pessimistic view of this business. In 2004, SKIP went
out of business.
There were a few reasons why Fast Retailing
retreated from this diversified business First, SKIP was
regarded as not promising in that a sizable deficit was
building up in the fledging stage of business. It was
easily conceivable that Yanai became despondent over
the snowing debt of SKIP. Second, an accurate
delivery system was not well-established. Customers
never knew when a shipment of vegetables would at
their homes. Thus, they could not prepare when to
cook no matter how healthy, safe and tasty the
delivered vegetables were. Third, the customers also
had to buy in bulk. Fourth, vegetables had to be
consumed in a very short time because they were
highly perishable.
These factors were inescapable shortcomings that
weighed heavily on the SKIP business model. It was
voiced among business critics that SKIP could not
make ends meet, regardless of how lofty the business
model.
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20.  Turn Around
2002 saw the company reach its nadir. During a
period of downturn, Yanai was infuriated by the
responses from mass-meda because they had admired
Yanai’ s business acumen when the company achieved
good turnover, then they bitterly criticized his
management skill when the company failed to achieve
the expected outcome. It was frequently observed in
the economic magazines and newspapers that the
prospects for Fast Retailing seemed gloomy, and that
its heyday was abruptly finished.
However, the company showed resilience in
breaking a two-year logjam. On August, 2003, Sales
turnover was improved, compared with that of the
same month the previous year. In the same year, the
company bought out Link International, a New York-
based apparel company. Link International managed
the brand shop, Theory. Fast Retailing reinforced the
Uniqlo brand through this buyout.
21.  Strategy in the Next 10 Years
It may not be denied that Fast Retailing will go
global despite many overseas management setbacks.
Moreover, Yanai insisted on his grand target that Fast
Retailing should achieve sales turnover exceeding one
trillion yen (approximately nine billion dollars) in the
Japanese domestic market, and at the same time the
company must achieve turnover of more than one
trillion yen in overseas affiliated companies. It may
be that Yanai must seek a global linkage through a
mega-M&A to realize this ambitious turnover.
Yanai also maintained that clothes produced by
Fast Retailing should transcend any differences in
cultures. They can sell without any national
boundaries. This philosophy is broadly diffused,
permeated and indoctrinated in senior members of the
organization.
On July, 2005, it was announced that Yanai was
going to assume the position of CEO again next year
to rev up the company while the present CEO,
Tamazuka stepped down. Tamatsuka attempted to put
the company on an innovative foundation for further
growth, but he failed to show a gratifying result to
Yanai.
In the same year, Uniqlo shops were opened in
Korea. The Uniqlo brand is becoming recognized
favorably by Korean people who are sensitive to the
fashion trends. At the same time, shops with more than
1500 square meters almost the equivalent of the
average size of a GAP store were opened in the
suburban areas of local cities in Japan. Fast Retailing
seems poised on an aggressive stance to expand
domestically as well as abroad.
Yanai is still young. He will turn 57 years old in
2006. He could foreseeably hold the reins over the
company since its establishment. Success was neither
inexplicable nor inscrutable for Yanai. It can be
presumed that he is so confident that the tenacious,
elastic and resilient trial and error management method
which was initiated by him will put the company in at
the right track in the end.
The next decade will be a testament to whether
Fast Retailing can compete in the global arena, and
vie with Nike, Gap, Marks & Spencer, etc. It goes
without saying that the potential for the next success
lies in the enormous financial surplus and the way how
it will be invested. (Table 1 Worldwide Apparel
Specialty Stores)
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Table 1
WORLDWIDE APPAREL SPECIALITY STORES
Ⅲ.  Factors of Success
1.  Opportunities for Breaking Through
Every company is conditioned and constrained in
the historical characteristics of the industry it belongs.
Fast Retailing is not an exception. The success of Fast
Retailing resulted from the challenge against the
entrenched structure and the vested interests of the
Japanese apparel industry.
Long before category killers like Fast Retailing or
Shimamura（シマムラ）arrived on the scene,
Japanese consumers had to buy clothes that were
relatively expensive, considering production costs.
The major reason for this comes from innumerably
small apparel factories, intricate marketing channels,
inefficient divisions of production and capricious
merchandising pipelines.
In addition, tracing back to the late 1980s and early
1990s, there was a chasm in the fashion trend between
these two decades. In the last couples of years in the
1980s, the Japanese apparel industry culminated with
DC brand shops which sold exorbitant clothes to
customers, whereas in the early 1990s people were
inclined to buy inexpensive clothes owing largely to
the collapse of the bubble economy and its
longstanding aftermath of the economic stagnation.
Fast Retailing could take advantage of the change in
the fashion trend and sluggish economy.
With hindsight, if SWOT analysis was applied to
the management circumstance of Fast Retailing in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the analysis would have
portended the success. The company had great room
for opportunity and strength to make inroads into the
existing market, compared to the weaknesses and
threats inherent in the fledging company because most
competitors were nestling down into the vested market
share.
In addition, the apparel business in GMS lost its
position to CD brand shops and roadside men’s shops.
The Japanese apparel industry was in a chaotic
situation.
Yanai capitalized on this discrepancy in
consumer’s patterns, introducing innovative products
in the apparel industry. As C.M. Christensen stated,
“most companies with a practiced discipline of
listening to their customers and identifying new
products that promise greater profitability and growth
are rarely able to build a case for investing in disruptive
technologies until it is too late.”(10)
2.  SPA-Based Manufacturing System
In order to implement sustained production and
stable sales simultaneously, Yanai combined the upper
stream with the downstream through SPA in terms of
production. Controlling the upper stream meant
producing goods in China. Overseas production
generated a cutting edge which enabled the company
to reduce prices and to remain competitive.
What is more, high quality could be well-
maintained because the contracted factories were
under the strict supervision of Fast Retailing. The
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company excluded factories showing poor
performance. Cost reduction was successfully
interlinked with upgrading the quality of products.
Accordingly, in vying with competitors, the company
was not trapped in the vicious circle of price reduction
which might have incessantly incurred losses.
Regulating the downstream was to oversee
marketing channels and to make the operation of shops
more efficient. In other words, Yanai succeeded in
realizing a global vertical integration to directly link
the division of production with that of retail by
introducing SPA into the company.
SPA was introduced in 1989, but it took five years
before SPA was satisfactorily operating even though
Fast Retailing was the innovator that introduced SPA
to the Japanese apparel industry.
3.  Dominant Strategy
A dominant strategy can be defined as a marketing
strategy that concentrates on a sales target in specific
areas. It is based on the idea of creating a geographical
advantage. A company adopting the strategy can enjoy
cost reduction in terms of delivery, supervision and
advertisement, which can be effectively and efficiently
realized within a narrow and well-defined sphere of a
marketplace.
This strategy makes consumeres inclined to buy
goods by making them easily learn, recognize or spot
where the shops are located. The dominant strategy
can be observed in major retailing companies such as
McDonald’s, StarBucks, and Seven Eleven. In this
sense, the strategy is a kind of effective marketing
deployment which consciously or unconsciously
attracts people because of convenience.
As for Fast Retailing, the stores numbered more
than 400 in Japan in 1998. After the fleece boom
arrived, Fast Retailing exceeded its gigantic rival,
Shimamura, in total sales in 1999. Subsequently, Fast
Retailing surpassed Ito-Yokado, the biggest
supermarket chain in Japan in operating profit in 2000.
In 2005, the number of stores totals 680. (see, Chart 3
Number of Stores by Region)
4.  GAP is Targeted
In addition to the soaring number of stores, floor
space has gradually expanded year by year.  (see, Chart
4 Total Sales Floor Space) The expansion of store area
is one crucial strategic concern for Fast Retailing
because it is believed among management that the
pleasant atmosphere of large-sized stores will convince
customers that the quality of Uniqlo is good.
This policy is driven by Yanai, who has challenged
Gap since his company was established. This is why
he follows the retailing strategy of Gap. For that
reason, he tends to disregard Japanese competitors.
The average shop floor area is 1500 square meters,
compared with the average 550 square meter shop
floor area of Uniqlo. The size of Gap is almost three
Chart 3
Number of stores by Region
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Chart 4
Total Sales Floor Space (m2)
times as large as that of Uniqlo. The largest Gap store
is estimated at 3000 square meters.
5.  Lucrative Tactics of Closing Shops
Fast Retailing has a swift and firm “scrap and
build” decision-making policy to close existing shops,
no matter how new they may be. This means that
management evaluates the capacity of store in terms
of sales efficiency. In other words, as far as Fast
Retailing is concerned, closing shops is a positive sign
that they yield profitability: compared to the size of
the store, producing unexpected profits undermines
an opportunity to make more profit.
If shops fail to meet this expectation from
management, it is decided without hesitation that they
are to be closed as soon as possible to renovate and
expand or move to a new store nearby with more floor
space to collect more customers. Otherwise,
competitors would build a new store in the same
commercial zone to compete with Fast Retailing. This
is why the company avoids procrastination in decision
making.
Relevantly, Yanai detests that the decrease in
profits accompanies the increase in revenue partly
because the company is losing opportunities to make
money and partly because management is not making
a strenuous effort enough to discover organizational,
marketing, or financial problems and to improve them.
According to him, “the increase in the revenue that
entails a decrease in profits” is much worse than “the
reduction in the revenue that causes a decrease in the
profits”.
6.  Logistics & Supply Chain Management
According to  the  Counci l  of  Logis t ics
Management, “Logistics is that part of the supply chain
process that plans, implements, and controls the
efficient, effective flow and storage of goods, services,
and related information from the point-of-origin to
meet customers’ requirements”(11). In contrast to
logistics, it may be defined that “Supply Chain
Management is the integration of key business
processes from end user through original suppliers that
provide products, service, and information that add
value for customers and other stakeholders”(12).
Fast Retailing applied supply chain management
to the logistical operations for Uniqlo. The decision
of introducing SPA in the strategic nucleus inevitably
made the company get involved both in developing
the logistical system and in establishing sophisticated
supply chain management.
The quick response system introduced by Fast
Retailing is an eclectic way of combining supply chain
management with logistics to expedite business
operation. The quick response system was a by-
product contrived from the logical consequence of
SCM accordingly.
There were many reasons why Fast Retailing
integrated SPA with SCM. First, the quick response
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system contributed to reduce production and sales cost
by curtailing redundant, superfluous and unnecessary
pipelines. This rationalized procedure could reflect the
reduction in the price of clothes. Second, a better
communication system was made between Fast
Retailing and affiliated companies by sharing
concurrent information. Third, by recognizing hot-
selling items on-line, management could trace back
to the latest consumers’ behavior. What is more, each
shop could grasp the inventory situation any time,
avoiding losing opportunities to sell out clothes which
were predicted to be out of stock, while zeroing in on
the best selling time of the most popular items.
The introduction of a quick response system gave
the company a competitive advantage and cutting edge
against clothing importers and DC brand shops
because both of them tend to miss the best opportunites
to sell the most popular items in that the time span
from orders to shipments was too long. They were
less likely to meet customer satisfactions than Uniqlo.
7.  Service Management
Different from emporiums or boutiques whose
clerks positively and willingly move close to and push
towards customers, the method for waiting on
customers in Uniqlo is remarkably standardized and
self service-based according to manuals. Shopping
baskets are provided inside the shop. Clerks seldom
approach and speak to customers when they enter the
shop to look at clothes. The shop lets them choose by
themselves as much as possible as do supermarkets.
This keeps labor costs low, which, therefore,  keeps
the product lines affordable.
Also, the operation of shops is for the most part
run at the shop chief’s discretion, which means that
the organizational structure between the head office
and shops is decentralized in order to make decision
making of the shop floor independent and autonomous.
Management indoctrinates and inspires shop chiefs
to have a self-employed spirit. Therefore, it can be
easily inferred that meritocracy was introduced in the
salary and bonus of employees, based on their sales
achievements.
8.  Good Financial Performances
Fast Retailing demonstrates highly distinguished
financial performance. It seems that this is a deep-
rooted management tradition for the company to evade
excessive financial burdens as a result of the indelible
lesson that there were numerous conflicts between the
company and local banks with respect to financing
before its IPO in the early 1990s.
The 2004 balance sheet in its annual report reveals
that Fast Retailing has no long-term debt. It also shows
that the company is run in a state of abundant surplus,
not heavily dependent on borrowing from banks. The
total amount of sales is approximately 330 billion yen.
The operating profit is about 65 billion yen. The ratio
of the operating profit to the total amount of sales is
19%. This is exceptional, compared with those of other
major retailers. The proportion of capital to retained
earnings is about 17 times. This means that the
company enjoys 170 billion yen in internal reserves
which indicates a 70 percent capital-to-current assets
ratio. Moreover, securities, deposits and savings total
135.6 billion yen in liquid assets.
Inventories are 27.8 billion yen. Net profit before
income taxes is 60.5 billion yen. These figures resulted
from the fact that the company avoided investing in
the fixed assets such as real estate or store facilities.
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is only 27%. In
addition, efficient inventory management greatly
contributed to profitability. (Table 2 Six-Year
Financial Summary)
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Ⅳ.  Impediments Against Further Growth
1.  Cutthroat Competition in a Sluggish Economy
Because of the long-standing recession-induced
slump in demand since the collapse of the bubble
economy, the apparel market still languishes. Fast
Retailing cashed in on this languid situation of the
Japanese apparel industry. Nonetheless, this company
is also facing new difficulties in increasing sales.
First, consumer behavior is more diversified in the
2000s than ever before, although the apparel market
is saturated and its growth is stagnant. Moreover, the
total sales amount of the apparel industry continued
to shrink as purchasing power became weaker year
by year, whereas every apparel company is being
squeezed by price pressures. Fast Retailing is involved
Source: 2004 Annual Report, Fast Retailing
Table 2
Six-Year Financial Summary
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in mutually destructive competition although it is an
undeniable profit maker.
Second, competition is becoming fiercer. The long-
standing rival, Shimamura,（シマムラ）always stays
just behind Fast Retailing in terms of total sales. This
company is a formidable competitor for Fast Retailing.
There are three reasons: Shimamura opens stores all
over Japan, outnumbering the stores of Uniqlo; the
average prices of clothes in Shimamura are twice as
cheap as those of Uniqlo; and Shimamura has more
product lines, compared with Uniqlo.
Five Fox（ファイブフォックス）and Ryohin
Keikaku（良品計画）are also encroaching on the
business domain of Uniqlo. Similarly, department
stores and GMS always try to outflank Uniqlo by
frequently holding bargain sales.
Third, European and U.S. famous brand shops such
as Land’s End, Benetton, Giorgio Armani, Patagonia,
and the most dominant profit maker, GAP, are
reinforcing management systems to expand sales in
Japan. These foreign multinational apparel companies
are invisibly making inroads to the business domain
of Fast Retailing.
2.  Customer-Focused
(1) How to Cope with Whimsical Customers
Fast Retailing caught the right customers at the
turn of the 2000s. They were young and bored with
wearing expensive CD brands or shabby inexpensive
imported clothes. Many famous musicians and singers
were featured on T.V. commercials to make Uniqlo
identified and recognized by youths. They were
captivated by the impressive commercials of Uniqlo.
However, consumer behavior is whimsical and
fashion trends are ever-changing. The unprecedented
popularity of fleece caused a reactionary cynicism
among younger generations, who saw Uniqlo
becoming a national uniform for Japanese. The
negative estimation, “The more Uniqlo sold, the
smaller individuality grows” ran rife as Uniqlo brands
became rapidly widespread in Japan.
The contemporary younger generation in the 2000s
seems to move away from the prospective target
customer that Fast Retailing was seeking before.
Rather, it does not go too far to say that Fast Retailing
has lost sight of potential customers.
The imminent task of strategic management
inherent in Uniqlo is how it should be well-positioned
to attract contemporary customers in the 2000s, who
are totally different from those ten years ago.
Otherwise, customer-focused operations would not
work. However, it seems hard to satisfy increasingly
demanding consumers who are apt to change their
tastes in a couple of years, and who willingly follow
both luxurious and affordable clothes simultaneously.
For these reasons, Fast Retailing assertively expands
its product lines to cover men, women and baby’s
clothes irrespective of sex and age. (See, Table 3 Sales
by Product Category)
Table 3
Sales by Product Category
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A possible solution to overcome the present
problem may be to establish a new brand in addition
to Uniqlo. The new brand should be categorized in
the upper segment of the apparel market where Uniqlo
cannot be properly positioned.
(2) How Uniqlo Can Eschew Its Stereotype
Yanai stated in the 2004 annual report that “In late
September, we surprised everyone by running ads
announcing that Uniqlo was disassociating itself from
low-cost clothes.” He also mentioned in the same
report that “Rather, it is our intention to completely
overturn this misconception of our clothing being
merely good for the price. We will transform the
public’s image of Uniqlo from relatively good clothing
to absolutely good clothing.”
However, it is a big challenge to change a brand
image that has a long history. The problem is that
Uniqlo clothing is deeply associated with the ingrained
stereotype that Uniqlo supplies low priced clothing.
However, it is this very stereotype that brought success
to Fast Retailing. It may be assumed that changing
the brand image is self-destructive in confusing
customers, which would be inimical to company
growth. Even though Fast Retailing succeeded in its
brand image, the company needs a huge amount of
investment for advertising. It would also take more
than one decade for customers to accept the new
image.
3.  Low Entry Barrier
Fast Retailing bore the brunt of competitors
utilizing the same management maneuvers. The
characteristics of Uniqlo products could be observed
in high quality and good function despite the low price.
These features were tangible assets. This means that
Fast Retailing did not intend to pursue intangibility
with clothes requiring creativity, uniqueness, and
elegance which feature. This is a tender point for Fast
Retailing that many competitors can imitate Uniqlo.
For that reason, Uniqlo products could be easily
imitated by competitors. Once they understood that
the Uniqlo marketing strategy yielded big profitability,
many of them were making the same products as
Uniqlo, thus imitating the concepts of design, quality,
and even the merchandising pipelines. However, Fast
Retailing has no effective deterrent forces to curb this
kind of imitation.
This can be applied to the 4Ps of marketing theory.
The 4Ps stands for Price, Place, Promotion and
Product. Each strand of the 4P which were set for Fast
Retailing was so innovative at the time when the
Uniqlo brand was released in the late 1980s that it did
not draw the attention of Uniqlo competitors.
This was like a blitz operation. However,
competitors began to turn around at the turn of 2000,
zeroing in on the same tactics as Uniqlo. Any
remarkable difference between Uniqlo and
competitors was growing nebulous.
4.  Overseas Sales Expansion
Fast Retailing succeeded in overseas production,
but overseas sales deployment was a different story.
Fast Retailing succeeded in gaining a large share in
the domestic market, but it has not yet managed to
establish its brand overseas. The company is learning
that advancing overseas is a tough game. There are
four postulations as follows.
First, it is very risky to deploy a dominant strategy
which requires tremendous investment in a country
which is entirely different from Japan. Moreover,
Uniqlo brand is not recognized overseas. Advertising
and promotion costs will be enormous to make
potential overseas costumers recognize Uniqlo, and
to compete strong competitors in the host countries.
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Second, fierce domestic competition curbs Fast
Retailing’s advances abroad. It can be assumed that
management is very apprehensive of losing their
market share and sales to domestic competitors in
Japan, and it is wrestling with many formidable
competitors from overseas.
Third, it is conceivable that the diversified business
plan may be an impediment to overseas advances.
Sufficient management resources cannot be properly
allocated to overseas operations as long as the
company continues to concentrate on exploiting new
business in Japan. It may be that diversifying business
in the domestic market is detrimental to overseas
success, particularly in terms of human resources.
Fourth, it seems very difficult to recruit staff with
business versatility in addition to successful business
experience in the apparel industry. This may stem not
only from a managerial climate of Fast Retailing but
also from a cultural barrier between Japan and overseas
countries. However, it may be possible to produce
manuals which foster resourceful employees overseas,
as the company will accumulate know-how of overseas
operations.
5.  Business Diversification
Yanai is preoccupied with increasing sales amount.
The imposing target exceeds 1 trillion yen. This is
why he concentrates on business diversification.
However, the recent noticeable business failure of Fast
Retailing was a retreat from SKIP. This business
domain was totally irrelevant to that of the apparel
business. Core competencies was not accumulated
within the company.
It can be inferred that the conglomerate-based
expansion strategy may undermine management
momentum. Many lessons show that a brand is
blemished by increasing the number of brands without
due consideration. Multitudinously enlarging business
domains runs the risk of both blurring the quality of
brands and diminishing the core competence of the
company.
There are many lessons from the expansion
strategy to boost sales. As Jack Trout put it(13), GM,
Nabisco, McDonald’s, Philip Morris, Miller Brewing
and Porsche made the same mistakes by aggressively
expanding the number of brands. This strategy
backfired in the end. The sales amount of these
companies slowed down after they began to enlarge
the number of domains.
Ⅴ.  Theoretical Implication
1.  Towards a theoretical Implication
Many management practitioners propose that
management should be globally enmeshed in order to
make profits. Internationalization may be a theoretical
kernel for further growth of a company aiming for
global business. In particular, internalizing
headquarters and overseas subsidiaries is foremost in
outmaneuvering competitors. Otherwise, the company
would be strategically and tactically stalemated sooner
or later.
In fact, Fast Retailing took advantage of
internationally internalizing the company in order to
realize SPA, by introducing SCM. Internalization is a
successful formulation for high performance
companies.
2.  Internalization Theory
Internalization theory is mostly based on the
transaction costs of a firm with respect to its
monopolistic or oligopolistic behavior in the micro
economic perspective. A. Rugman, M. Casson, J. H.
Dunning and P. J. Buckley, although seemingly
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categorized in the Reading School, are pathfinders in
contributing to the construction of a new theoretical
framework of multinational behavior.
In the early 1970s, firms which largely relied on
exporting in relation to international business were
rapidly multinationalized irrespective of their sizes and
countries of origin. The theoretical focus was shifted
to the competitive advantage of the parent companies
and their overseas subsidiaries, international alliances,
joint ventures, and licensing. Consequently, the
proponents of internalization conducted in-depth
empirical studies to bolster their theory, shedding light
on the relationships between behavioral patterns of
headquarters in advanced countries and those of
subsidiaries in developing countries.
In particular, according to John Dunning, the
behavioral pattern of a multinational corporation must
be analyzed in terms of ownership-specific advantage,
location specific variables, and internalization
incentive advantage.(14) It is assumed that these three
salient strands determine the way that multinational
corporations are successfully operated abroad.
Over the past decades, internalization theory seems
to have been a sacrosanct tenet for formulating the
activities of multinational corporations. Moreover,
global outsourcing by MNCs has been regarded as a
quintessential factor for survival in borderless
economic competition.
It is apparent that internalization provides a cogent
theoretical background behind the strategic
significance of global outsourcing. The success of this
fast-growing company and the relevant domestic
deployment based on overseas manufacturing
operations appeared to validate the accuracy of
internalization theory.
3.  Is Internalization Theory Tenable?
In contrast to the theoretical dominance of
internalization, however, the present experience of
Fast Retailing described in this paper casts doubt on
internalization theory. The overriding reason is that
strategic rationale is being undermined because
numerous companies have advanced in developing
countries in order to take advantage of low labor costs
and low taxation. With special relation to the apparel
industry, because most companies capitalize on
Chinese production, geographical advantage is lost so
that the theoretical validity of internalization becomes
untenable.
In the light of the strategic setback of Fast
Retailing, it can be observed that, no matter how
effectively or efficiently internalization is long-term
profitability is not guaranteed. The company realizes
that a cheap labor force is becoming peripheral to
survival amid relentless global competition.
Establishing an entrenched worldwide brand matters
most to success as has been demonstrated by the Louis
Vuitton, Hermes, and Armani which seem immune to
any price-based competition. For this reason, Fast
Retailing’s business stalemate raises objections to the
sweeping generalization of internalization.
4.  Summing Up
It is conceivable that internalization theory is
vulnerable to dynamic competition in the home
country no matter how closely the international
networks are systematized or made interdependent in
terms of cost effective behavior.
Thus, it can be surmised that the proponents for
internalization theory ignore or underestimate the
dynamic arena of industrial competitiveness in that
the main research coverage is limited to the
interdependent relationship between the parent
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company and subsidiaries. The theoretical frame of
reference is static and holistic, if not based on self-
fulfilling prophecies, and never accounts for why
MNCs lose profitability in the home country
accordingly.
This is why the retreat or financial losses of MNCs
have not been dealt with in terms of internalization
theory. In other words, internalization theory does not
explain why prosperous MNCs lose competitiveness
despite interlocked, meshed interdependence between
the parent companies and their overseas subsidiaries
through global SCM.
It must be noted that internalization theory should
be reconsidered in the context of strategic planning
deployed by the headquarters in the home country. If
not, it will lose its analytical driving force in the
labyrinth of ever-changing MNC behavioral patterns.
Ⅵ.  Conclusion
The historic advent of Fast Retailing drew attention
to management practitioners and scholars at the turn
of 1990s. The main success seems to be attributed to
the insightful entrepreneurship of Yanai, the founder
of Fast Retailing. In particular, SPA was a driving
force and a strategic nucleus for organizational growth
as was delineated in this paper. This innovative SPA-
based operation was circumspectly implemented under
his strong leadership.
Without the SPA concept, the company would not
have developed so rapidly. After Alfred Chandler, an
American famous management historian, conducted
the comparative research for the U.S. major
companies, as he concluded, “The comparison
emphasizes that a company’ s strategy in time
determined its structure and that the common
denominator of structure and strategy has been the
application of the enterprise’s resources to market
demand.”(15) It may be said that Yanai followed this
maxim with fidelity no matter how much he is aware
of management theory.
However, Fast Retailing seems to face the
innovator’s dilemma despite huge net profits in the
light of the turnover after 2001. Many apparel
companies are imitating the original SPA-based
strategy created by Fast Retailing. The company
cannot rest with only overseas production as a further
competitive edge any longer. Competitors are creating
new brands to outflank Fast Retailing.
The most serious problem may be that the brand
of Uniqlo is firmly fixed in the minds of consumers.
Under these circumstances, the once successful
strategy which was set for affordable price and high
quality may not work. In other words, the renowned
brand of Uniqlo may hamper further growth of the
company. A new brand may be needed, which is
clearly differentiated from Uniqlo.
It has been frequently announced in the public
relations of the company that Fast Retailing has an
ambitious plan to make the company global. The
company needs another successful experience in the
domestic market to brace for competition with major
multinational apparel companies in the global arena.
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